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Abstract— Data aggregation is an efficient mechanism widely
used in wireless sensor networks (WSN) to collect statistics
about data of interests. However, the shared-medium nature of
communication makes the WSNs are vulnerable to eavesdropping
and packet tampering/injection by adversaries. Hence, how to
protect data privacy and data integrity are two major challenges
for data aggregation in wireless sensor networks. In this paper, we
present iPDA— an integrity-protecting private data aggregation
scheme. In iPDA, data privacy is achieved through data slicing
and assembling technique; and data integrity is achieved through
redundancy by constructing disjoint aggregation paths/trees to
collect data of interests. In iPDA, the data integrity-protection
and data privacy-preservation mechanisms work synergistically.
We evaluate the iPDA scheme in terms of the efficacy of privacy-
preservation, communication overhead, and data aggregation
accuracy, comparing with a typical data aggregation scheme –
TAG, where no integrity protection and privacy preservation is
provided. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results show
that iPDA achieves the design goals while still maintains the
efficiency of data aggregation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is consisted of spatially
distributed sensor nodes which cooperatively achieves one or
several global functionalities. An important functionality of
sensor networks is the to answer queries about the data ac-
quired by the sensors. Large sensor networks usually generate
substantial amounts of data, but the sensor nodes are often
resources-limited or energy-constrained. Hence it is important
to design and develop efficient data processing techniques to
make effective use of the data. Data aggregation [1], [2] is
an efficient mechanism in query processing in which data are
processed and aggregated within the network. Only processed
and aggregated data is returned to the base station. In such
a setting, those nodes in the network who help aggregating
information requested by the query are called aggregators.
They collect the raw information from the sensors, process
it locally, and reply to the aggregate queries of a remote user.
Compared to the centralized approach where all raw data are
returned, data aggregation can achieve significant reduction in
communications and hence save resource consumptions and
increase the lives time of WSNs.
Nowadays, WSNs are involved in more and more civilian
applications, where the privacy and integrity of data are
important concerns. However, it is very challenging to address
privacy preserving and integrity protection at the same time,
since usually privacy-preserving schemes need to paralyze
traffic monitoring mechanisms, and thus barricade the integrity
protection. Therefore, a good data aggregation scheme need
to be carefully designed for those applications requiring both
privacy preservation and integrity protection.
As an example, the advanced metering systems [3] for data
collection and control on electronic power grid demonstrate
such demand. An “advanced mete” is an electronic meter (i.e.
a sensor) that can be read remotely. Advanced metering system
is a key component in simplifying the management com-
plexities and reducing the running costs of future generation
electronic power grids. Advanced metering systems could be
used for purposes beyond simple metering, for example, they
are important for accurate resource planning and inventory
control. However, both data privacy and data integrity issues
are of paramount concerns for these systems:
1) Privacy: Advanced meters can be used to determine
not only whether a metered premise is occupied, but also
how the occupants of the premise are currently behaving [4].
This information could be correlated with location information
to develop detailed profiles of those individuals, unless we
control the dissemination of such information.
2) Integrity: Electronic power grids can be attacked by
internal or external attackers. These attackers can insert, delete,
or alter sensor readings or intermediate aggregation results for
various purposes. For example, a dishonest organization may
either reduce the total usage reported or shift usage data from
higher-priced time intervals to lower-priced intervals in order
to reduce their bills. As a result, the integrity of collected data
are comprised.
In this paper, we present iPDA (Integrity-Protecting Private
Data Aggregation), a novel data aggregation scheme which
addresses both privacy-preservation and integrity-protection
for wireless sensor networks.
In iPDA, to protect data integrity, we utilize node-disjoint
aggregation trees in a sensor network. Since each node belongs
to a single aggregation tree, a malicious node can only pollute
the aggregation result on aggregation tree it belongs. Hence
by comparing the results from different aggregation trees,
the base station can verify the integrity of the aggregation
results. To preserve data privacy, we utilize data slicing and
assembling technique. A sensor hides its private reading by
slicing it into pieces and then sends encrypted data slices
to different aggregators within its vicinity. Upon receiving
slices from different sensor nodes, an aggregator calculate
the intermediate aggregate value and further aggregate them
to the base station along the aggregation trees. In iPDA,
the integrity-protection mechanism and privacy-preservation
mechanism work synergistically while aggregation is being
carried out within the network.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to
address both privacy preservation and integrity protection in
data aggregation for wireless sensor networks. As we will
show in Section IV through theoretical analysis and simulation
study, iPDA is also light-weight in terms of computation and
communication. Moreover, iPDA yields accurate aggregation
result in reasonably dense networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the background and requirements of integrity-
protecting private data aggregation schemes in wireless sensor
networks. Section III provides the detailed architecture design
and protocol descriptions of iPDA. Section IV evaluates iPDA
through analysis and simulation. Section V summarizes the
related work most pertinent to this paper. We conclude our
findings and lay out future research directions in Section VI.
II. MODEL AND BACKGROUND
A wireless sensor network (WSN) is deployed in a certain
area to detect a common phenomena. Sensors perform mea-
surements. They are are usually simple, low-powered devices
which can communicate only within small range of their
location. Hence a resource-enhanced base station is deployed
to answer queries about (or obtain statistics of) the measured
values.
A. Network Model
In this paper, a sensor network is modeled as a connected
graph G(V,E). A vertex v, (v ∈ V) in the graph represents a
sensor node. An edge e, (e ∈ E) represents a wireless link. As
long as two sensors are able to communicate directly, there
exists an edge connecting them in the graph.
There are three types of nodes in the network: base station,
aggregator, and leaf (sensor) node. The base station is the
node who answers the queries. Hence it is the node where
aggregation result is destined. In this paper, we only con-
sider a single base station case. iPDA is readily extensible
to multiple base station cases. In general data aggregation
protocols [1] [5] [6], aggregation trees root at the base station
are usually constructed. The non-leaf nodes, except the root, in
the aggregation tree serve as intermediate aggregators. They
are responsible for forwarding queries and combining answers
from their children and forwarding intermediate aggregation
results to their parents. Note that any sensor node may also
serve as an aggregator.
B. Data Aggregation Function
Consider a network of N nodes. A generic aggregation
function is defined as y(t)  f(r1(t), r2(t), · · · , rN (t)), where
ri(t) denotes the individual sensor reading of node i at time
t. Typical functions of f include sum, average, min, max
and count. In this paper, we focus on additive aggregation
functions. It is worth noting that using additive aggregation
functions is not a too restrictive assumption, because it serves
as the base of many other statistics functions, such as mean,
count, variance, standard deviation, etc. For example, to get
the variance of all the sensor data ri(t), i ∈ V, f(t) =∑
i(r
2
i (t))/N − ((
∑
i ri(t))/N)
2
, each sensor only needs to
contribute three inputs as the original data in the additive data
aggregation, they are 1 (count), ri(t), and r2i (t).
Furthermore, functions such as MIN and MAX, can also
be approximated through additive functions. This is be-
cause max(x1, ..., xN ) = limk→∞(xk1 + ... + xkN )
1/k and
min(x1, ..., xN ) = limk→−∞(xk1 + ... + x
k
N )
1/k
. Hence we
can assign k to a large value estimate max(x1, ..., xN ) and
min(x1, ..., xN ) accordingly. Therefore, in this paper we only
study data aggregation for additive function, i.e y(t) ∑N
i ri(t).
C. Attack Model
A malicious attacker can perform a wide variety of attacks
to break the privacy and integrity of aggregation results. In
general, it is impossible to prevent all kinds of attacks. In this
paper, we focus on the defence of the following categories of
attacks in wireless sensor networks.
Eavesdropping: In an eavesdropping attack, an attacker
attempts to obtain private information by overhearing the
transmissions over its neighboring wireless links. Eavesdrop-
ping threatens the privacy of data held by individual sensor
nodes.
Data Pollution: In a data pollution attack, an attacker
tampers with the intermediate aggregation result at an aggre-
gation node. The purpose of the attack is to make the base
station receive the wrong aggregation result, and thus make the
improper or wrong decisions. In this paper, we do not consider
the attack where a sensor node reports a false reading value.
As indicated in [6][7], the impact of such an attack is usually
limited. Therefore, a more serious concern is the case where
a non-leaf aggregation node close to the root of aggregation
tree is compromised.
D. Design Goal
The overarching design goal of this paper is to provide an
data aggregation scheme, which is robust against eavesdrop-
ping, and at the same time is capable to detect data pollution.
Therefore, a desired data aggregation scheme should satisfy
the following criteria:
Privacy-preservation: Privacy concern is one of the major
obstacles to apply the wireless sensor networks to civilian
applications, where curious individuals may attempt to de-
termine more detailed information by eavesdropping on the
communications of their neighbors. It is increasingly important
to develop privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes to
ensure data privacy against eavesdropping.
Data Integrity: Since data aggregation results may be used
to make critical decisions, a base station needs to attest the in-
tegrity of the aggregated result before accepting it. Therefore,
it is important that data aggregation schemes can protect the
aggregation results from being polluted by attackers.
Efficiency: Data aggregation achieves bandwidth efficiency
through in-network processing. In integrity-protecting private
data aggregation schemes, additional communication overhead
is unavoidable to achieve the additional features. However, we
must keep the additional overhead as small as possible.
Accuracy: An accurate aggregation result of sensor data is
usually desired. Therefore we take accuracy as a criterion to
evaluate the performance of integrity protecting private data
aggregation schemes. When accurate aggregation results are
needed, schemes based on randomization techniques [8], [9],
[10] are not applicable.
III. INTEGRITY-PROTECTING PRIVATE DATA
AGGREGATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we present the detailed architecture and
protocol design of iPDA.
A. Protocol Overview
Data aggregation is initiated by a base station, which
broadcasts a query to the whole network. Upon receiving the
query, leaf nodes report their readings to their aggregators
(parents along the spanning tree rooted at the base station),
and then aggregators perform in-network processing and route
the aggregated results back to the base station. However, in
most conventional data aggregation protocols, data integrity
and privacy are not preserved at the same time.
To achieve the integrity, we resort to redundancy check by
constructing two disjoint aggregation trees. Each sensor node
needs to send its reading to both aggregation trees, and makes
the inputs to both trees equal. The disjoint aggregation trees
perform data aggregation individually. Therefore, data pollu-
tion attacks can be detected at the base station by comparing
aggregation results along the disjoint aggregation trees. If the
aggregation results agree with each other, then the base station
will accept the result. Otherwise, the base station knows that
there exist either data pollution attacks or node failures, or
both.
To address privacy, we tailor the “slicing” technique [11],
where each participating sensor node (either a leaf node or
an aggregator) hides its individual data by slicing the data
and sending encrypted data slices to different neighboring
aggregators1, then the aggregators collect and route aggregated
results back to the base station. Due to the associative property
of addition, “slicing” technique is able to conceal the original
sensor readings as well as keep the aggregation efficient and
accurate.
In this section, we present the details of the iPDA protocol.
There are three phases: disjoint aggregation tree construction,
privacy-preserving data report, integrity-protecting data ag-
gregation as follows.
1Though a node only has one parent node (aggregator) in an aggregation
tree, it is very likely that the node is able to reach other aggregators within
its transmission range
B. Disjoint Aggregation Tree Construction (Phase I)
In order to utilize redundancy to verify integrity of aggre-
gation results, we construct node-disjoint aggregation trees in
the first phase of iPDA. In this paper, we build two disjoint
aggregation trees. Assuming m is the number of disjoint
aggregation trees, m = 2. We call the two aggregation trees,
red aggregation tree and blue aggregation tree, respectively.
The disjoint aggregation tree construction phase can be easily
generalized to build multiple aggregation trees (m > 2).
However, to achieve good coverage of disjoint trees when
m > 2, the network must be very dense. In this phase, each
node, except the base station, takes one of the three roles: red
aggregator, blue aggregator or leaf node. The base station is
the root of both red aggregation tree and blue aggregation
tree, so it is both a red aggregator and a blue aggregator.
The disjoint tree construction follows the procedure illus-
trated in Figure 1, where the dark colored solid nodes repre-
sent blue aggregators and light colored solid nodes represent
red aggregators. First, the base station BS initiates a query
by issuing a HELLO message. Upon receiving the HELLO
messages from both red and blue aggregators, a node makes
the decision on its role. A node becomes a red aggregator
with probability pr(0 < pr < 1), becomes a blue aggregator
with probability pb(0 < pb < 1) and 0 < pr + pb ≤ 1), and
becomes a leaf node with probability 1− pr − pb.
Note that if a node is unable to reach either red aggregators
or blue aggregators within one hop, the node cannot send its
data values directly to both colored aggregators. In order to
achieve the separation of data aggregation along the disjoint
trees, red aggregators are not allowed to forward the data for
blue aggregators, and vice versa. Therefore, if a node never
receives HELLO message from either red or blue tree, the node
does not participate in data aggregation.
To make more nodes receive HELLO messages from both
red and blue aggregators, it is desired to balance the red
aggregators and blue aggregators in a given neighborhood.
Hence, a node is likely to choose red color, if there are more
blue aggregators than red aggregators in its neighborhood.
A node can estimate the number of red/blue aggregators in
its neighborhood from the received HELLO messages. In this
case, upon receiving HELLO massage from at least one blue
aggregator and at least one red aggregator, a node waits for a
certain period of time to get enough HELLO messages before
it makes the decision on its color. Therefore, the node can
have a good estimation of colors of its neighbors, and selects
its color to maximize the chance that other nodes will receive
HELLO messages both red and blue aggregators. We will show
that only a very small portion of nodes do not participate in
the data aggregation in our scheme when the network is dense
enough (in Section IV).
If a node becomes a red/blue aggregator, it will join
the corresponding red/blue aggregation tree and forward the
HELLO message to its neighbors; otherwise, the node is a leaf
node. As this procedure goes on, disjoint aggregation trees,
red tree and blue tree, are constructed. In iPDA, the following
properties are desired:
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(a) BS triggers the aggregation by a
HELLO message, then nodes receive
such a message select their roles: blue
aggregator, red aggregator, and leaf
nodes. Base station is treated as both
blue and red aggregator. Aggregators
will forward the HELLO messages.
(b) Node A,D,E,H, I receive HELLO
messages from both blue and red aggrega-
tors, then they randomly select their roles.
Node B,C, F,G, J only receive HELLO
from red aggregators, so should wait until
they receive HELLO messages from both
blue and red aggregators.
(c) As the disjoint tree construction
procedure continues, we can form
two disjoint aggregation trees rooted
at the base station. Blue aggregators
and red aggregators interleave with
each other.
Fig. 1. Illustration of disjoint tree construction, where pb = pr = 0.5.
(1) The disjoint aggregation trees are interweaved with
each other. Therefore almost every node can find a blue
aggregator and a red aggregator in its neighborhood. Since
if a node does not have a red aggregator or blue aggregators
in its neighborhood, the node cannot participate in the data
aggregation. In order to have more nodes participate in the data
aggregation, thus the aggregation result is more accurate, both
aggregation trees should cover network as much as possible.
In this case, we should have enough number of aggregators.
(2) On the other hand, in a very dense network, we desire
that only a portion of nodes serve as blue or red aggregators.
Since leaf nodes do not need to forward HELLO message and
intermediate results to its parents, we can reduce the band-
width consumption by reducing the number of aggregators.
To ensure these two contradictory properties, we adopt
adaptive strategy to determine pr and pb for each individual
node according to the number of HELLO messages the node
received from red aggregators and blue aggregators. The value
pr + pb should be larger, if a node gets a smaller number
of HELLO messages. Therefore, we can get better coverage
of the aggregation tree. Also, if a node hears more HELLO
messages from red aggregators than from blue aggregators,
the node will take larger chance to be a blue aggregator to
balance the blue and red aggregation trees. Therefore, we can
determine pr and pb accordingly,
pr = p
Nblue
Nblue +Nred
,
pb = p
Nred
Nblue +Nred
. (1)
where Nblue is the number of HELLO messages from the blue
aggregators, Nred is the number of HELLO messages from the
red aggregators, and p is the probability that a node becomes
an aggregator (either red or blue), hence p = p r + pb. We can
determine value p as follows
p =
{
k
Nblue+Nred
, if (Nblue +Nred) > k
1 , otherwise.
In the above equation, k(k ≥ 2) is predetermined param-
eter. Value k balances the coverage of the aggregators and
communication overhead. If k is large, then all nodes are
aggregators. If k is small, some nodes in the network may
not be covered by aggregation trees. In this paper, we take
k = 4. The compelling features of using a fixed k value are
its simplicity and its inherent adaptability to network density.
That is, in a dense network, a portion of nodes are aggregators;
in a non-dense network2, all nodes are aggregators. We can
reduce Equation (1) to Equation (2) below for simplicity.
pr = pb = 0.5 (p = 1). (2)
To ensure the integrity of data aggregation results, the
disjoint tree construction protocol should guarantee that a
node cannot be in both the blue tree and the red tree (i.e
the constructed aggregation trees are node-disjoint). Though it
is possible that an adversary may intent to send two HELLO
messages with different colors. Such behavior can be easily
detected by its neighbors due to the shared-medium nature of
wireless links. Therefore, the adversary can be excluded from
both aggregation trees.
C. Privacy-preserving Data Report (Phase II)
To preserve the privacy in data aggregation, sensors need to
hide their original readings in the first hop data reporting. In
iPDA, each sensor hides its reading by slicing it into pieces
and randomly sending encrypted data slices to its neighboring
aggregators. Then aggregators assemble the received data and
treat the assembled data as their own readings. Then aggre-
gators follows aggregation procedure described in Section III-
D to route the aggregated result to the base station. Privacy-
preserving Data Report phase includes two steps: data slicing
and data assembling.
2Note that in a sparse network, even if all the nodes are aggregators, the
coverage is not good. So iPDA requires adequate network density.
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Fig. 2. Slicing step by node i (l = 3)
1) Slicing: First, a node needs to randomly select l red
aggregators and l blue aggregators from its neighboring nodes
(including itself). If a node itself is a red aggregator, then it
always selects itself and l − 1 other red aggregators. Then
the node randomly slices the data into l pieces and sends
a piece to each of the selected neighboring red aggregators
including itself. The node also slices the original reading
into l pieces independently to the previous l slices, and then
sends a piece to each of the selected blue aggregators in the
neighborhood. Totally, each node takes 2l−1 transmissions in
the slicing step. Note that when nodes send the sliced data
pieces to their neighbors, link level encryption is needed.
Without encrypting sliced pieces, an adversary is able to
eavesdrop all the transmissions by a given sensor node due
to the shared-medium nature of wireless links. Hence, the
adversary can easily recover the original data of that node 3.
Figure 2 depicts the slicing step at node i, assuming node
i is a red aggregator. We denote d(i) as the private data at
node i, and dij as a slice of data sent from node i to node j.
Hence, d(i) =
∑N
j=1 dij . Note dii is kept locally at node i,
no transmission is needed for dii. For nodes to which node i
does not send any slice, dij = 0. The final aggregation result
is expressed as
f =
N∑
i=1
d(i) =
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 dij
2
. (3)
Let B stands for the blue aggregator set, and R stands for
the red aggregator set. Then
f =
N∑
i=1
d(i) =
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈B
dij =
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈R
dij . (4)
2) Assembling: When a node j receives an encrypted slice,
it decrypts the data using its shared key with the sender. Upon
receiving the first slice, the node waits for a certain time,
which guarantees that all slices of this round of aggregation
are received. Then, it sums up all the received slices r(j) =∑N
i dij , where dij = 0, if node i does not send a sliced
data to node j. Figure 3 describes the assembling step, where
r(j) = dvj + duj + dwj + dxj + dyj + dzj + djj . After
the assembling, node j treats r(j) as its data reading to be
aggregated.
3In TAG, even if the link level encryption is used, neighbors of leaf nodes
can easily know the original data held by the leaf nodes.
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Fig. 3. Assembling at node j
D. Integrity-protecting Data Aggregation (Phase III)
After disjoint aggregation trees have been constructed
(Phase I), and nodes obtain assembled data (Phase II), the
final phase of iPDA follows the standard aggregation protocol
along individual aggregation trees: nodes sum up the results
from their children in the aggregation tree it belongs, and
forward the sum to its parent within the same aggregation
tree. Eventually the aggregated data reaches base station.
If without data loss, it is easy to derive that on the red
aggregation tree:
∑
j∈B
r(j) =
∑
j∈B
(
N∑
i=1
dij
)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈B
dij =
N∑
i=1
d(i) = f.
(5)
Similarly, on the blue aggregation tree,
∑
j∈R
r(j) =
∑
j∈R
(
N∑
i=1
dij
)
=
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈R
dij =
N∑
i=1
d(i) = f.
(6)
However, in reality
∑
j∈B r(j) and
∑
j∈R r(j) may not
exactly the same as each other due to inevitable data loss.
But aggregation values from different trees should not deviate
from each other too much, if without pollution attack. So if
|∑j∈B r(j)−∑j∈R r(j)| ≤ Th, the base station will accept
the aggregation result; otherwise, reject it. We will discuss the
selection of Th through simulation in Section IV-B.
When there is a pollution attack, iPDA can detection it and
reject the result. This is because in iPDA, no single node is
on two distinct aggregation trees. Hence if an attacker inserts
or alters the intermediate aggregation value, the aggregation
results from different trees will be different. Therefore, at the
base station the aggregation results from different trees do
not agree with each other, hence the polluted result will be
rejected.
Note that a malicious node may issue a DoS attack by
polluting the intermediate aggregation results, forcing the base
station to reject the aggregation results constantly. This can be
prevented by intelligently selecting a different portion of the
sensors to participate in the aggregation at each round, hence
locate the malicious node and excluded it in O(logN) rounds.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance and discuss
some design considerations of iPDA through detailed theoret-
ical analysis and simulation study. For this purpose, we im-
plemented iPDA and another typical data aggregation scheme
– TAG [1] using ns-2 simulator.
A. Theoretical Analysis
1) Coverage of Aggregation Trees: In iPDA, a sensor node
reports its reading to the base station by aggregation only when
the sensor node is able to reach both red and blue aggregation
trees within one hop. In the case that a node cannot reach
both aggregation trees, the node is disconnected from the base
station for aggregation. We define Φ(G) as the probability that
all the nodes in graph G are covered by both aggregation trees.
If Φ(G) is small (i.e the coverage is poor), a large number
of nodes cannot contribute their readings to the aggregation
result. Therefore, the coverage of aggregation trees implies
the accuracy of aggregation results.
Consider a random graph G(N, r), where N is number of
nodes and r is the transmission range of a node. As shown in
[12], as N is large, G(N, r) is connected if and only if there
are no isolated nodes (nodes with degree zero). Therefore, if
we randomly assign red or blue color to nodes in the graph
G(N, r), and let X denote the number of nodes which are
isolated from either blue nodes or red nodes, then
Φ(G) = P (X = 0). (7)
Define Xi as the indicator variable of whether node i has both
blue and red neighbors within one hop distance, so
Xi =
{
0, i has both blue and red neighbors;
1, otherwise. (8)
For a random network whose size is large enough, {X i} can
be approximated as identical independent distributions(IID).
Therefore, the total number of nodes which are isolated by
either of the aggregation tree is X =
∑N
i=1Xi. Let di denote
the number of physical neighbors of node i. The probability
that i is isolated by the red aggregation tree is given as
pdib . Similarly, i is isolated by the blue aggregation tree with
probability pdir . Let pi be the probability that node i is isolated
by either blue nodes or red nodes, then
pi = 1− (1− pdib )(1− pdir ). (9)
From the definition, we also know pi = P (Xi = 1). Since
X =
∑N
i=1Xi, we can obtain a lower bound of Φ(G), when
applying Markov Inequality P (X ≥ 1) ≤ E[X ] = ∑Ni=1 pi.
That is,
Φ(G) ≥ 1−
N∑
i=1
pi. (10)
This bound is tighter for smaller pi values. The condition to
obtain a small pi holds when the network is dense, i.e di is
large. As an example, consider a d-regular graph, assuming
pb = pr = 0.5, we have Φ(G) ≥ 1 − N(1 − 122d ) according
to Equation (9). Therefore, Φ(G) ≥ 0.999 for N = 1000 and
d = 10. From Equation (10), we see that the coverage of
aggregation trees are very good for dense networks.
2) Communication Overhead: Figure 4 compares the com-
munication messages sent and received by each node in data
aggregation under TAG and iPDA respectively. In TAG, each
node sends two messages to answer a query: a HELLO
message and a message for an intermediate result. In iPDA,
additional 2l − 1 messages are introduced by slicing the
original privacy-sensitive data into l slices. Hence, a total
of 2l + 1 messages are sent by each node. Therefore the
communication overhead ratio of iPDA to TAG is 2l+12 .
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Fig. 4. Communication messages for TAG and iPDA
3) Capacity of Privacy-preservation: As illustrated in Sec-
tion III-C, iPDA achieves privacy-preservation through slicing
and assembling the private data. In iPDA, we use link level
encryption to prevent the data slices from being overheard by
an adversary. According to different assumptions and design
goals, sensor networks may use different types of key man-
agement and encryption schemes. One of the merits of iPDA
scheme is that it can be built on top of any key management
scheme. In spite of the link level encryption, there are two
possibilities that may cause privacy violations:
• Under some key distribution schemes (e.g. random key
predistribution [13] [14]), two neighboring nodes share a
common key for communication. However, a third node
may also hold the key and is able to decrypt messages
communicated between the two nodes.
• An attacker compromises multiple neighbors of a node
and gets the shared keys with the node. In this case, the
attacker may decrypt enough slices of data sent by the
node, hence obtain the original private data.
Let px denote the probability that an attacker can overhear
the communication on a given link. We are interested in
obtaining the capacity of privacy-preservation at a certain node
i. The capacity is represented by the probability P idisclose(px),
which is the probability that node i discloses its reading to
some other nodes under a given px.
When node i slices the original data into l pieces, it sends
l slices to aggregators who have different color from itself,
and sends l−1 slices to aggregators who have the same color
with itself (in this case one of the slices is kept locally at
node i). To reveal the privacy-sensitive data held by a node i,
an attacker need either to break l outgoing links, when node i
sends l slices to aggregators of different colors; or to break l−1
outgoing links and all of the incoming links as well. Denote
E[nl(i)] as the expected number of incoming links of node i.
Then E[nl(i)] =
∑
j∈Neighbor(i)
(2l−1)
dj
, where Neighbor(i)
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Fig. 5. Capacity of privacy-preservation in iPDA
is the set of node i’s one hop neighbors, and d j is the physical
degree of node j. We can see that
P idisclose(px) = 1− (1− plx)(1− pl−1+E[nl(i)]x ). (11)
As an example, let us consider a d-regular network (d >>
l), where E[nl(i)] = 2l − 1. For l = 3, d = 10 and
px = 0.1, the probability that a privacy violation occurs
is P idisclose(0.1) = 0.001. For a random network topology,
the average of P idisclose(px) is defined as Pdisclose(px) =
1
N
∑N
i=1 P
i
disclose(px), which is much larger than that in a
regular graph.
Figure 5 plots Pdisclose(px) over px for the scenario that
1000 sensor nodes are distributed in a square area, and the
average degree of a node is 7 and 17, respectively. We observe
that the privacy preservation capacity of iPDA is insensitive to
network density. We also observe that Pdisclose(px) is smaller
for l = 3 than that for l = 2. However, the privacy preservation
performance for l = 2 is good enough, and a larger l yields
larger overhead in slicing and message communication. So we
recommend l = 2 in iPDA.
4) Capacity of Detecting Data Pollution: In iPDA, en-
cryption is a necessity for privacy-preservation. However, no
encryption or decryption is needed to achieve the integrity
when there exists data pollution. iPDA is able to detect mul-
tiple attackers as long as they do not collude with one other.
iPDA utilizes redundancy by constructing disjoint aggregation
trees to verify the integrity. Any individual attackers may
manipulate the intermediate aggregation results along one
aggregation tree, but the attackers cannot pollute the data
on the other tree. Even if the aggregation result is polluted
by multiple individual attackers, the results from different
aggregation trees cannot agree with each other. In this case,
the base station will detect the violation of data integrity and
reject the false result. In practice, the base station accepts the
aggregation results from both aggregation trees, say S b and
Sr, if |Sb − Sr| ≤ Th, where Th is a small positive number.
Using Th helps to tolerate data losses which may occur in
a wireless network. We use simulation results to demonstrate
what Th value we should take in Section IV-B.
B. Simulation Results
iPDA employs redundancy for integrity protection and em-
ploys data slicing for privacy preservation. When comparing
with standard data aggregation schemes such as TAG, iPDA
achieves two important design goals, i.e. integrity and privacy,
at the cost of communication overhead. We provide the ana-
lytical results regarding the aggregation performance in IV-A.
Next, we assess the performance of iPDA through simulation
study. We implement TAG and iPDA in ns-2 simulator. In our
experiments, sensor nodes are randomly deployed over a 400
meters × 400 meters area. The transmission range of a sensor
node is 50 meters and the data rate is 1 Mbps.
1) Th Value Setting: In practice, with the possible data
losses due to congestions and collisions in wireless sensor
networks, aggregation results from both aggregation trees (S b
and Sr) may not agree with each other exactly. In iPDA,
an adjustable parameter Th is introduced to tolerate those
losses. If |Sb − Sr| ≤ Th, the base station accepts the result.
Th is an important design parameter. We simulate iPDA
scheme for 50 times and obtain Figure 6, which illustrates the
difference between aggregation results from red and blue trees
for COUNT aggregation. We notice that the differences are
small. Hence, we see that Th can be set as a small value, e.g.
Th = 5. The “perfect” curve in Figure 6 shows the aggregation
result where there is no data loss (ideal case).
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2) Communication Overhead: Figure 7 shows the commu-
nication overhead of TAG, iPDA without slicing (l = 1), and
iPDA with slicing l = 2. The simulation result verifies our
theoretical analysis result that when we slice the data into l
pieces, the total bandwidth consumption is around 2l+12 times
of that in the standard TAG scheme. When we deploy less
than 300 sensors in the 400 meters × 400 meters square,
the average degree is less than 14. Such a network density is
relatively low. In this case some sensor nodes may not receive
the HELLO message, and some may not have enough red and
blue aggregators in their one hop neighborhood to send the
sliced data. Therefore, they cannot participate in the data ag-
gregation according to iPDA protocol. So the total bandwidth
consumption is low when N < 300. This also explains why
the accuracy under iPDA is poor as shown in Section IV-B.3
below, when network density is low (N < 300). To show
the effect of network density on communication overhead and
accuracy metrics, Table I summarizes the average node degree
according to a given number of nodes on a 400 meter × 400
meter square.
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TABLE I
NETWORK SIZE V.S. NETWORK DENSITY
Number of nodes 200 300 400 500 600
Average degree 8.8 13.7 18.6 23.5 28.4
3) Coverage and Accuracy: When there is no data loss
in the data aggregation, iPDA yields 100% accurate aggrega-
tion results. However, in a real sensor network data loss is
inevitable due to the following reasons:
(a) In the disjoint tree construction stage, if the network
density is low, then some nodes may be unreachable by both
red and blue aggregation trees. In this case, those nodes do not
participant in the data aggregation. Thus, some data is missing
in the final aggregation result.
(b) In the data slicing stage, assuming each reading is sliced
into l pieces, if a red node cannot find l−1 red neighbors and
l blue neighbors within one hop, the node does not participate
in the data aggregation. Hence, the data held by such a node
get lost.
(c) In disjoint tree construction, slicing, and data aggrega-
tion stages, the data loss may be caused by collision in wireless
channels.
Figure 8(1) illustrates the percentage of nodes which can
be reached by both red tree and blue tree. Note that data
loss caused by factor (a) is reflected in Figure 8(1). Only
if a node can be reached by both aggregation trees and has
enough neighbors to send slices of date to achieve privacy
preservation, the node participates in the data aggregation.
Figure 8(2) shows the percentage of nodes which participate
in the data aggregation. Hence, the data loss caused by factor
(a) and (b) is embodied in Figure 8(2). All three factors are
reflected in Figure 8(3). It demonstrates the percentage of
nodes which contribute to the final COUNT aggregation result.
We define the accuracy metric as the ratio of the collected sum
by a given data aggregation protocol to the real sum of all
individual sensors. Value 1.0 of accuracy represents the ideal
situation, where there is no data loss. Figure 8(3) indicates
the accuracy metric of iPDA comparing with TAG. A higher
accuracy value means the collected sum is more accurate.
Due to the similarity of Figures 8(a)(b)(c), we conclude
that factor (a) is the dominating factor which causes data loss
in sparse network. However, when the average degree of a
network is large enough, factor (c) is the major reason for
data loss, which is very small though (usually less 5%). From
Figure 8, we can also conclude that in order to achieve excel-
lent accuracy under iPDA with the recommended parameter
l = 2, the average network density should be larger than 18.
V. RELATED WORK
Data aggregation has the benefit to achieve bandwidth and
energy efficiency in resource-limited wireless sensor networks
[1]. Previous work [15], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20], [21], [22]
address data aggregation in various application scenarios.
To address the integrity of data aggregation, Przydatek et al.
present SIA protocol in [2] by constructing efficient random
sampling mechanisms and interactive proofs. Due the random
sampling mechanisms, final aggregation results accepted by
the base station may not be very accurate. Moreover, when the
sample size is large, the additional communication overhead
may cancel out the benefit from data aggregation in bandwidth
consumption. Yang et al. propose SDAP protocol [6] for
secure data aggregation in sensor networks using “divide-and-
conquer” and “commit-and-attest” principles. Similar to SIA,
due to the statistical detection, SDAP may not be able to detect
the attacks which change the intermediate aggregation result
mildly.
In privacy-preservation domain, Huang et al. address the
problem in a peer-to-peer network application in [23]. They
constructed a friends peer-to-peer overlay to gather PC config-
uration samples using history-less random walk, during which
search is carried out simultaneously with secure parameter
aggregation for troubleshooting. Privacy-preserving data ag-
gregation schemes in wireless sensor network environments
have been studied in [11]. However, the work in privacy preser-
vation domain does not assume data manipulation attacks. Han
et al. built a lightweight decentralized anonymous peer-to-peer
systems in [24]. Privacy-preservation has also been studied in
the data mining domain [8], [9], [10]. Two major classes of
schemes are used. The first class is based on data perturbation
(randomization) techniques. In a data perturbation scheme, a
random number drawn from a certain distribution is added to
the private data. Given the distribution of the random pertur-
bation, recovering the aggregated result is possible. However,
data perturbation techniques do not yield accurate aggregation
results. Furthermore, as shown by Kargupta et al. in [9] and
by Huang et al. in [10], certain types of data perturbation
might not preserve privacy well. Another class of privacy-
preserving data mining schemes [25], [26] is based on Secure
Multi-party Computation (SMC) techniques [27].SMC deals
with the problem of a joint computation of a function with
multi-party private inputs. SMC usually leverages public-key
cryptography. Hence, SMC-based privacy-preserving schemes
are usually computationally expensive, which is not applicable
to resource-constrained wireless sensor networks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Data aggregation is an important technique to save com-
munication bandwidth and increase network life time for data
collection in wireless sensor networks. With more and more
applications of wireless sensor networks in various domains,
how to protect the integrity and privacy of the collected data
are becoming crucial concerns.
We propose the iPDA, a novel integrity-protecting private
data aggregation scheme for wireless sensor networks. iPDA
exploits disjoint trees for data aggregation, hence facilites
the base station to identify if the data is polluted by in-
termediate aggregators. To protect the privacy of individual
sensor readings, iPDA utilizes slicing technique to hide the
privacy-sensitive data of individual sensors from other nodes.
A notable property of iPDA is, unlike sampling-based or
approximation-based schemes, iPDA can get accurate aggre-
gation results for reasonably dense networks.
iPDA is also light-weighted in terms of computational
complexity and communication overhead.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to
address both integrity protection and privacy preservation of
data aggregation in wireless sensor networks.
As a future work, we are interested in investigating integrity-
protecting privacy-preserving data aggregation schemes under
collusive attacks.
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